A Struggle for Homeland and Identity

Special: Ecologist 2003
Sanat K Chakraborty writes of the plight of the Hajong and Chakma refugees and the social crisis caused by their displacement due to the Kaptai dam.

85-year-old Akhil Chakma asked a wildlife official surveying the Budhisatta village, one of the few refugee settlements inside the Namdapha National Park in the Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh.

As one of several thousand refugees, Akhil says that he has reconciled himself to living with uncertainty, humiliation and the vagaries of life – the predicament of an "outsider". But he is deeply worried about the future of his son, Boli and his grandchildren. With decades of mental agony and physical toil writ large on his sunken face, he spoke haltingly, in broken Assamese and Bengali with a feeble voice. "Ki hoibo, uni janen (Only Buddha knows what will happen)."

Boli, now a father of five, was barely two when the waters of the Karnaphuli river had devoured his homeland at Rangamati in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT) following the construction of the 50 m.-high, almost 600 m.-long Kaptai dam. His parents, alongwith thousands of others, were forced to cross over from the erstwhile East Pakistan to India in the 1960s. 2,902 Chakma and Hajong families were settled in the remote, sparsely populated North Eastern Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh) at three designated camps: Lohit, Tirap (now Changlang) and Subansiri. Each family was allotted five to 10 acres of land. Altogether 35,000 Chakmas and Hajongs were issued valid migration certificates confirming their legal entry into India.

While their new life was full of uncertainties, for many it was a new lease on life. In an unknown, unfriendly environment, with sheer grit and hard work, the refugees developed their allotted plots into fertile farms. From available forest resources, especially bamboo and cane, they used their traditional skills to produce food, handicrafts, and household implements. They grew paddy, vegetables, cash crops such as mustard, chilly and ginger and raised livestock and poultry. The only other support they had was from government-sponsored refugee rehabilitation grants.

In three decades, the refugees' numbers multiplied to over 65,000, about half never having seen their homeland. However, the Chakmas and Hajongs continue to face an uncertain future with a status worse than that of refugees – as a stateless people.

The Chakmas, one of the 14 major indigenous tribes in the CHT – collectively known as the Jumma people – represent one of Asia's worst victims of a human-made disaster. Their plight can be directly traced back to the construction of a huge dam at Kaptai in the hill districts of erstwhile East Pakistan in the early sixties. Funded by the US, the multi-million-dollar mega dam, then touted as a symbol of development and human ingenuity, turned out to be a major human tragedy, affecting hundreds of thousands of marginalised hill tribes, their land, forests and livelihood.

According to official figures, the dam submerged at least 400 sq. km., including 16 sq. km. of reserved forest. About 54,000 acres of arable land (40% of the total farmlands in the valley!) were lost under the rising waters, uprooting nearly 18,000 families.(1) This was the first batch of Jumma tribes, mostly Chakmas, who were forced to migrate to India in search of a new life and eventually ended up in refugee camps in the easternmost part of what is now Arunachal Pradesh.

The Karnaphuli hydropower scheme (KHPS), the country's first and largest hydroelectricity plant was constructed in 1957 at Kaptai, on the river Karnaphuli, about 65 km. away from the Chittagong city. The Karnaphuli originates in northeast India and runs through the CHT before draining into the Bay of Bengal. The first unit was set up on February 26, 1962 and four others were subsequently added between 1962 and 1988. Numerous studies that have since been carried out suggest that the entire Kaptai power project was not only ill-conceived, but also intended to suit the political goals of the then rulers. The colossal human costs that have followed is totally unacceptable, especially at a time when there is a growing focus on environmental justice, humanitarian laws and human rights.

The damming of the Karnaphuli river created the huge Kaptai reservoir, which was meant for fisheries development, irrigation, drinking water supply and tourism, besides generating electricity to feed growing factories and major urban centres in the plains – at an unprecedented cost to the hill tribes. The existing five units of the Karnaphuli hydel power project, currently managed by the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), together have 230 MW installed capacity.

The Chakma story, of course, goes beyond the issue of the Kaptai dam and the displacement it caused. Their sufferings have to be understood in the religious, cultural and socio-political circumstances that followed the partition of British India. The Jumma people – mostly Buddhists and animists – desired to be a part of India rather than the Islamic state of Pakistan. But the CHT was clubbed with Pakistan by the British.

The former Jumma leader Upendra Lal Chakma identified three major events that followed the partition of the subcontinent, setting off the painful struggle of the Jumma people.(2) In 1960, Pakistani President Ayub Khan abolished a 1900 regulation preventing the settlement of plains people in the hills and converted the 'excluded areas' into tribal areas (restrictions regarding access and settlement of non-indigenous people in the region were removed). Secondly, a policy of resettling plains people in the hills to counter the perceived pro-India tribes was adopted. The last step was the construction of the Kaptai dam.

A Bangladeshi author writes: "The Kaptai dam and subsequent 'development' of the CHT region proceeded from the racist assumption that indigenous peoples were incapable of 'development' without the intervention of the advanced sections of the country, i.e. the plains people."(3)

Crises for the Chakma

The impact of these political designs on the Chittagong hill tribes was manifested broadly in two major crises. The first phase (1947-71) of the Chakma tragedy was a direct consequence of anti-tribal policies, particularly the construction of the Kaptai dam, pursued by the East Pakistani regime. Insecurity, loss of land and livelihoods and the fear of politico-religious persecution forced thousands of Buddhist Chakma families to flee to India creating a serious refugee problem on this sensitive border. The Hajongs, a Hindu tribal group from Mymensingh district also migrated during the same period to northeast India. By the middle of July 1964, at least 1,40,000 Chakma and Hajong refugees reached Assam through tenuous jungle tracks in Tripura and Mizoram. While several thousand Chakma and Hajong migrants were accommodated despite opposition from these states, a solution to the Chakma settlement in Arunachal Pradesh remained elusive.

Following the creation of Bangladesh in 1972, the same oppressive anti-tribal policies were persisted with. With the settlement of plains people on the tribal lands in the CHT continuing unabated, the Awami League-led Sheikh Mujibur Rahman government gave vent to strident nationalism advocating 'Bangladesh for Bengalis'. This further alienated the tribal communities from mainstream politics. The loss of land and forest resources pushed the tribes into an armed struggle. The conflict between the Shanti Bahini, the Jumma-armed wing of the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) and the Bangladeshi army during the 1980s and the early '90s resulted in further displacement. Over 56,000 Chakmas took refuge in the Indian state of Tripura. In 1997, following a peace agreement between the PCJSS-United Peoples' Party of CHT and the Bangladesh government, they were rehabilitated in the CHT. The Bangladesh government conceded to indigenous self-rule for the CHT within the constitution, a separate ministry, a regional council and recognition of the traditional chieftain's authority.

But the CHT crisis is far from over, with the Bangladesh government being accused of violating the peace agreement. Recovery of land from settlers remains the core issue, even as the government constituted a land commission.(4) Apart from that, growing factionalism in the Jumma leadership over the control of tribal affairs is also contributing to the continued misery of the hill communities.

Chakma struggle for Indian citizenship

The Chakmas' struggle for Indian citizenship rights arose following the Assam Accord in 1985, which accepted March 25, 1971 as the cut-off date for granting citizenship rights to East Pakistani refugees. The Chakmas and Hajongs who were settled in NEFA in the early '60s naturally wanted the same status. The issue went up to the Supreme Court, after local tribal organisations opposed the Chakmas' demand. In 1995, the All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union launched statewide agitation against the Chakma and Hajong refugees, calling for their social and economic boycott. The state government played a supportive role withdrawing the ration system and health care services, closing schools and afflicting gross human rights violations on the refugees. The National Human Rights Commission, meanwhile, moved the apex court to secure the rights of the suffering refugees. In January 1996, in response to a Chakma refugee petition seeking citizenship status, the Supreme Court's final verdict made the following observations:

"There is no doubt that Chakmas who migrated from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1964 first settled down in the state of Assam and shifted to areas which now fall within the state of Arunachal Pradesh. They have settled there since the last two and a half decades and raised their families in the said state. Their children have married and they too have had children. Thus, a large number of them were born in the state itself. If a person satisfies the requirements of Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, he/she can be registered as a citizen of India… Under Rule 9, the collector is expected to transmit every application under Section 5 (1)(a) of the Act to the central government. The collector has merely to receive the application and forward it to the central government. The DC or collector, who receives the application should be directed to forward the same to the central government to enable it to decide each request on merit."

The Supreme Court has further added: "No person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Thus, the state is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, citizen or otherwise. The state is duty-bound to protect the threatened group and if it fails to do so, it will fail to perform its constitutional as well as statutory obligations. The state government must act impartially and carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the life, health and well-being of Chakmas residing in the state without being inhibited by local politics."

Even though the Supreme Court ruling directs that the Chakmas and Hajongs be registered as citizens, the Indian government has made little progress on the ground. The deputy commissioners of Changlang, Tirap and Papumpare districts of Arunachal Pradesh have been asked to issue application forms for processing the citizenship certificate, but the process was abandoned due to political opposition from local tribal organisations.

Limited options

In an interview, former joint home secretary (in charge of the northeast), Gopal Krishna Pillai said that the Indian government was considering its options for the permanent settlement of the Chakma issue. The first option would be to distribute the 65,000 refugees all over India, but the availability of land and willingness of the Chakma people to move would pose stumbling blocks.

The second option would be to allow the Chakmas to remain at their present sites as Indian citizens, but without Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to ensure that the 60 ST assembly seats remain for the indigenous tribes.

The third option would be to give the Chakmas ST status but ensure that local political aspirations are not disturbed by reserving seats for indigenous tribes, who in many areas are a minority now.

Another possibility may be to declare a few additional assembly seats to ensure representation for the Chakmas in the state assembly. Individuals belonging to indigenous tribes may also be allowed to contest for the new seats.

It is certain that the Chakmas living in India have to be finally settled, and in all probability, at the existing settlement sites. Local politicians, who do not want to be named, admit that since the union government has decided to give them resident status, it is only a matter of time before they are eventually integrated into the local polity.

However, even if the Chakmas are finally settled in India, only one aspect of the twin problem would have been solved. The problem of the rehabilitation of the internally-displaced Jumma people in the CHT as well as the reclamation of their land remains. This can happen only when the Bangladesh government implements the CHT agreements in letter and spirit.

Meanwhile, a report(5) in the English daily The Independent stating that the Bangladesh government is considering expanding the KHPS by two units (2x50 MW) has generated concern. This will require the extension of the main dam and spillway. The report has caught the attention of environmental rights groups in Bangladesh, who have warned of colossal consequences, including international condemnation, at a time when the environmental and socio-economic impacts of large dams have come under sharp scrutiny. If the government were to go ahead with the project, the groups say that it would inundate another 40,000 acres of farm and hilly land and displace not less than 30,000 tribal people. The KHPS authorities, however, have dismissed these possibilities.

The newspaper quoted Md. Shahidur Rahman Khan, manager of KHPS as saying that the BPDB had assigned Atlanta Enterprise to conduct the environmental impact assessment study for the project and that a Japanese financial institution had agreed to invest in it. However, there has been no official confirmation of these reports. If another report that the Khaleda Zia government has asked the BPDB to go slow on the project following stiff opposition from the Jumma leaders is true, then there might be hope that the Chakmas will be spared further anguish by the Kaptai power project.

Sanat K. Chakraborty is a journalist based in Shillong and edits Grassroots Options, a magazine on people, environment and development published from Shillong, Meghalaya.

Endnotes:
  1. 1.Samad, WCD Report, 1994 and Bangladesh District Gazetteers: Chittagong Hill Tracts, 1975, Dhaka, Chapter VI, Economic Condition, 1, 26.
  2. Interview with Grassroots Options at a Tripura Refugee Camp, 1995.
  3. Dr. Shahdeen Malik, Regional consultation on refugees and migratory movements in South Asia, New Delhi, Nov. 14-15, 1996, pp. 44.
  4. Sanjeeb Drong, Bangladesh, The Indigenous World 2001-02 Report.
  5. Report by Md. Shahadat Hossain Riad, January 18, 2002, The Independent.
[First published: 11 May 2009 | Last updated: 11 May 2009.]
 
 
Notice
The Northeast Vigil website ran from 1999 to 2009. It is not operated or maintained anymore. It has been put up here solely for archival sentiments.

Parts of the old website, especially the extremely popular dams issue, have been resurrected. Other archived material will be uploaded here as and when I am able to salvage those. If at all.

Subir Ghosh
Notice
The Northeast Vigil website ran from 1999 to 2009. It is not operated or maintained anymore. It has been put up here solely for archival sentiments.

Parts of the old website, especially the extremely popular dams issue, have been resurrected. Other archived material will be uploaded here as and when I am able to salvage those. If at all.

Subir Ghosh